As Argentina’s government turns back to uranium and nuclear power, residents, scientists and former officials are asking who will really profit – and whether the country is quietly trading energy sovereignty for Washington’s strategic comfort.
A mining ghost town at the centre of a new nuclear gamble
High above the Chubut River in southern Argentina, the hamlet of Cerro Cóndor looks out over abandoned uranium works from the 1970s. The mine shafts are silent, the houses mostly empty, and locals still talk about unexplained cancers and rashes that nobody ever studied properly.
Those scarred hillsides are now back in play. President Javier Milei’s administration wants to restart uranium extraction at nearby Cerro Solo, one of the country’s biggest known deposits, as the first step in a radical overhaul of Argentina’s nuclear strategy.
Old uranium waste, a few fences and a “Restricted Area” sign are all that separate mine tailings from the river that feeds coastal cities.
For the Indigenous Mapuche communities who stayed after the last mining boom fizzled out, the prospect of drills returning stirs anxiety rather than hope. Many say they were promised jobs and development once before. What they remember is contamination, abandonment and a long silence from regulators.
Washington’s fingerprints on a ‘new’ nuclear plan
Milei has branded Argentina an “unconditional ally of the US” and is reshaping nuclear policy to match that posture. His roadmap rests on four big bets:
- Reopen uranium mines in Patagonia and other provinces
- Develop and export small modular reactors (SMRs)
- Use nuclear power to feed energy-hungry AI data centres
- Sell a large minority stake in the state nuclear utility, Nucleoeléctrica
Argentina already has a long civilian nuclear history. Its three reactors – Atucha I, Atucha II and Embalse – supply about 5% of the country’s electricity. The country also builds research reactors and produces medical isotopes, earning rare high-tech export income in Latin America.
This time, critics say, the nuclear push looks less like a development plan and more like a supply strategy for the United States.
Uranium for export, not for Argentine lights
Argentina stopped producing uranium in the late 1990s and has relied on imports since. On paper, reopening mines sounds like a step towards energy independence. Yet the fine print tells a different story.
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Dioxitek, a state company that processes uranium for Argentina’s reactors, signed a deal in 2024 with US-based Nano Nuclear Energy to provide uranium hexafluoride – a chemical form used in enrichment, not in Argentina’s own reactors, which rely on natural or low-enriched uranium oxide.
At the same time, Nano Nuclear inked an agreement with UrAmerica, a British-Argentinian firm with major uranium holdings in Chubut, with the stated aim of “strengthening US energy security” through a reliable fuel source.
Argentine reserves could fuel its own reactors for decades, yet new contracts are geared to meet US demand instead.
Former nuclear officials estimate that Argentina’s proven reserves could cover domestic requirements for about 70 years at current consumption. If nuclear capacity expanded, that horizon would shrink, but it would still represent a sizable buffer.
They argue that exporting raw uranium, rather than using it to power local industry, follows a familiar Latin American pattern: ship out minerals, import technology, and accept that the best-paid jobs stay abroad.
The sidelining of Argentina’s flagship reactor project
For decades, Argentina has invested in its own small modular reactor, known as CAREM. The project, under construction since 2014, is one of the world’s most advanced SMR designs. An OECD Nuclear Energy Agency survey in 2024 placed it in the top tier of global contenders.
More than £560m has already gone into CAREM, and engineers say the plant is roughly two-thirds finished. The design was meant to anchor local supply chains, from components to specialised services, and support exports to developing countries seeking smaller reactors.
The new administration has effectively frozen the project and branded it a failure. Instead, it is promoting a different SMR concept: the ACR300, a design only just patented and at around 1% development. The patent is held by a state-owned company – but through a US-based subsidiary, placing key intellectual property under American jurisdiction.
Argentina is shelving a nearly complete homegrown reactor to chase an early-stage design parked inside the US legal system.
Engineers say teams working on CAREM are being broken up and budgets pulled. Officials close to the Milei government insist they can deliver four SMRs within five years using the new approach, a claim specialists describe as unrealistic given the early stage of the technology.
From Chinese competition to US alignment
The shift also fits a broader diplomatic realignment. Under previous administrations, Argentina negotiated with China to purchase a Hualong One reactor as its fourth commercial nuclear plant. The deal would have diversified suppliers away from Western technology.
US officials pushed hard behind the scenes to block that project, according to former Argentine negotiators. Milei has now suspended it entirely, removing a potential Chinese foothold in Latin America’s nuclear market and easing US concerns over strategic competition in the region.
Privatising a profitable nuclear utility
Another front in the battle over Argentina’s nuclear future is ownership of Nucleoeléctrica, the company that runs the country’s reactors. The government wants to sell 44% of its shares to a private investor. Though not a majority stake, it would be the largest single block, giving significant control over long-term decisions.
That proposal has sparked anger because Nucleoeléctrica is one of the few state firms posting solid profits. It recorded a record 17.2bn pesos surplus in the first quarter of 2025.
| Key feature | Nucleoeléctrica today | After proposed sale |
|---|---|---|
| Ownership | 100% state-owned | 56% state, 44% private |
| Financial status | Consistent surplus | Profit-sharing with private investor |
| Strategic control | Public decision-making | Private actor gains major influence |
Opposition lawmakers tried to declare the company a “strategic asset” to block privatisation, but they are unlikely to muster the supermajority needed to override a presidential veto.
Critics say nuclear infrastructure, with lifespans stretching beyond 60 years and heavy international safety commitments, does not sit well with short-term profit motives. They worry that handing influence to private or foreign players will narrow Argentina’s room to set its own energy strategy.
Science budget cuts and a deepening brain drain
Behind the nuclear drama lies a broader assault on Argentina’s public science system. Milei came into office railing against what he called “caste” institutions and has slashed funding for research agencies, public universities and environmental monitoring bodies.
Unions estimate that 80–90% of staff at the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) now earn below the poverty line. Many specialists have left for better-paid posts abroad, taking decades of expertise with them. Official figures show that only a fraction of the approved budget for science and innovation was actually spent in 2024.
As skilled engineers leave, Argentina risks ending up as a raw-material supplier with no capacity to shape nuclear technology itself.
Former regulators warn that weakened oversight, underfunded labs and shrinking technical teams raise safety risks at existing nuclear sites and at legacy uranium waste dumps like those in Chubut.
‘Energy colony’ fears in Patagonia
Patagonia has a long history of resisting mega-projects. Chubut province banned open-pit gold mining after a 2003 referendum in which 81% voted against it. In 2021, a new attempt to open the central steppe to mining collapsed after days of mass protests, highway blockades and burnt public buildings.
The anti-nuclear movement is just as entrenched. Since the 1980s, dozens of towns have passed bylaws declaring themselves “non-nuclear” and forbidding nuclear materials within their boundaries. Many of those measures were born out of a successful campaign that stopped a proposed nuclear waste dump near the village of Gastre.
Now, with talk of new uranium pits and “nuclear cities” for AI data centres, local leaders warn that Patagonia is again being treated as a sacrifice zone.
“We’re being turned into an energy colony,” say Indigenous representatives, pointing to waste sites left unmonitored beside key rivers.
Residents worry about water. The Chubut River, which passes less than a kilometre from the old tailings in central Chubut, supplies drinking water to coastal towns including Trelew, Gaiman and Rawson. Internal CNEA reports over several administrations acknowledge gaps in radiation monitoring at the dump sites.
AI data centres and nuclear: a risky match
Milei and his nuclear adviser, Demian Reidel, have pitched Patagonia to Silicon Valley as an ideal location for AI infrastructure: cheap land, strong winds for backup renewable power, and potentially dedicated nuclear reactors feeding vast data centres.
In energy terms, the idea is not far-fetched. AI training clusters can consume as much electricity as small cities, and firms are keen on stable, low-carbon baseload sources. An SMR next door could in theory give them predictable power prices for decades.
Politically, the plan is far shakier. Patagonian provinces have some of Argentina’s most mobilised citizen groups on environmental issues. Many voters already view the central government as distant and extractive. Adding foreign-owned nuclear plants serving foreign tech companies could deepen that resentment.
What ‘energy colony’ actually means
When activists talk about an “energy colony”, they are not just speaking metaphorically. The term reflects a pattern where:
- Natural resources are extracted primarily to meet foreign demand
- Processing, technology development and value-added jobs occur abroad
- Local communities bear long-term environmental and social risks
- Strategic decisions are shaped by outside security or market priorities
Under that lens, exporting uranium to support US energy security, shelving domestic technology like CAREM, and tying new infrastructure to foreign investors start to look less like isolated choices and more like steps in a single direction.
The alternative vision, defended by many Argentine scientists, is not anti-nuclear. They back nuclear power combined with Patagonia’s strong winds and the intense sun of the north-west as a low-carbon mix. Their concern is who sets the terms: a sovereign state building long-term capabilities, or a resource provider competing on raw materials while others control the reactors and software.
For people in villages like Cerro Cóndor, that difference is not abstract. It is the gap between a future in which their lands supply steady electricity and decent jobs at home, and one where they inherit abandoned pits, fenced-off tailings and another generation wondering where the promised wealth went.
Originally posted 2026-03-03 15:22:23.