They are arriving at the annual Munich Security Conference not to paper over transatlantic tensions, but to push European leaders to stop accommodating Donald Trump’s foreign‑policy shocks and start preparing to confront them head‑on.
Democrats land in Munich with a warning, not a reassurance
This year’s US Democratic contingent in Munich is unusually high profile and unusually combative. The group includes California governor Gavin Newsom, New York congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Arizona senator Ruben Gallego, and Michigan governor Gretchen Whitmer – some of Trump’s sharpest critics at home.
They are joining a forum historically used to showcase unity between Washington and European capitals. Instead, they are expected to argue that Europe should stop trying to flatter Trump into cooperation and start building leverage against his threats on trade, Nato and Ukraine.
Democrats want Europe to stop treating Trump as an unpredictable storm and start treating him as a political reality that demands a strategy.
Newsom has already road‑tested that message. At Davos, he mocked European attempts to “appease” Trump, saying they made US allies look weak and desperate. Gallego has gone further, accusing Trump of shredding US credibility abroad and putting the country’s economic clout at risk “for petty reasons”. Those lines are likely to resurface in Munich, directed as much at nervous European ministers as at the former president himself.
Rubio leads the official delegation, but the split is out in the open
Formally, the US delegation is led by secretary of state Marco Rubio, who is trying to re‑assure European governments that Washington still values Nato and the EU. But the Democratic group is planning its own series of side meetings with European officials, thinktanks and civil society groups.
Traditionally, US politicians from both parties avoided airing domestic fights on the Munich stage. This time, the domestic split has become the story. Democrats are expected to tell European leaders something they rarely say so bluntly in public: stop counting on a quick restoration of the old transatlantic order, because it may not come back at all.
Behind that message sits a calculation in Washington: Trump’s poll slide and growing Republican rebellions on tariffs might not be enough to stop a second Trump term, or at least another two years of uncertainty. Democrats know European capitals quietly hope for a “return to normal”; they want to argue that waiting for that outcome is a security risk in itself.
Europe divided: stand up to Trump, or hold on to him?
Europe arrives in Munich with its own split on how to handle Trump. Two camps are hardening.
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| Approach | Key voice | Core idea |
|---|---|---|
| Defiant diplomacy | Emmanuel Macron | Push back openly, build European power, stop bowing to US pressure. |
| Conciliatory Atlanticism | Mark Rutte (Nato) | Keep Trump engaged, avoid ruptures, Europe cannot defend itself alone. |
French president Emmanuel Macron has branded the Trump administration “openly anti‑European” and accused it of seeking to “dismember” the EU. He points to the tariff threats over Trump’s attempted grab for Greenland as a turning point: once Europe hinted at serious economic retaliation, Trump backed off. For Macron, that was proof that Europe has more leverage than it thinks – if it chooses to use it.
On the other side, Nato secretary general Mark Rutte warns that talk of going it alone is fantasy. He argues that European defence, especially against Russia, still relies heavily on US logistics, intelligence and nuclear deterrence. In his view, antagonising Trump risks pushing Washington even further away from European security at the very moment Ukraine’s future hangs in the balance.
One Baltic diplomat summed up the daily dilemma: make their country more relevant to Washington, while still preparing for a day when Washington walks away.
A world shifting from rules to deals
The Munich meeting is happening against a wider rethink of the global system. Western leaders from London to Ottawa increasingly talk as if the old “rules‑based order” has already given way to a harder, transactional era.
Canadian prime minister Mark Carney captured that mood in Davos, arguing that the post‑cold‑war framework of treaties and institutions is broken beyond repair. Instead of pining for it, he said, medium‑sized powers such as European states should start shaping a new system that can withstand pressure from both Washington and Beijing.
This sense of an “interregnum” runs through the Munich agenda. German chancellor Friedrich Merz, UK prime minister Keir Starmer, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen and Macron are all expected to sketch out versions of more autonomous European foreign policy. The Democrats’ message will slot neatly into that conversation: if the US under Trump acts like just another great power, Europe needs its own coherent game plan, not nostalgia for the past.
Ukraine, China and the long road to European defence
Ukraine still ties Europe’s fate to Trump’s decisions. Trump has demanded a quick peace deal broadly on Vladimir Putin’s terms, a position echoed by vice‑president JD Vance, who insists the conflict is “not our war”. Any shift in US military or financial support would hit Kyiv within weeks and force Europe to decide how far it is willing – and able – to fill the gap.
Starmer has made clear that even ambitious European security guarantees for Ukraine still depend on US capabilities, especially air power and long‑range missiles. Defence budgets across the continent are rising, but serious rearmament takes a decade, not a single budget cycle.
At the same time, Europe is edging towards a more independent line on China. Leaders including Carney, Starmer and Macron have all tried to cool tensions with Beijing, signalling a preference for “de‑risking” supply chains rather than outright decoupling. Beijing, watching Trump dismantle multilateral trade structures, sees growing opportunities to lure European industries and finance into its orbit.
- Ukraine keeps Europe militarily tied to Washington.
- China binds Europe into a complex economic relationship.
- Trump’s tariffs and sanctions threaten both tracks at once.
That triangle leaves EU governments juggling contradictory pressures: align with Washington on security, keep access to Chinese markets, and hold domestic support for higher defence and energy costs.
Symbolic snubs and quiet shifts away from Washington
Signs of a slow decoupling from Trump’s Washington are already visible. Italy and Poland – both traditionally close to US administrations – recently refused to join Trump’s “Board of Peace”, an initiative critics see as a vanity project designed to centre Trump in every major peace process while sidelining the UN.
For Democrats, those snubs are encouraging. They suggest European governments are starting to weigh the long‑term damage of indulging Trump’s theatrics. The Democratic delegation is likely to urge more such collective pushback, arguing that fragmented responses only embolden Trump to test individual states one by one.
Democratic envoys want Europe to use its economic size, regulatory power and diplomatic weight together, rather than hoping for a personality change in Washington.
What “standing up to Trump” could actually look like
Behind the rhetoric, European officials in Munich are quietly sketching scenarios. Standing up to Trump does not necessarily mean breaking with the US; it could mean setting clearer red lines and preparing automatic responses when he crosses them.
Examples often mentioned in policy circles include:
- Coordinated tariff packages that activate if the US targets specific European sectors.
- A European‑led security fund for Ukraine that can keep weapons flowing even if US aid pauses.
- Joint statements by EU and non‑EU allies (such as the UK and Norway) that refuse to recognise any Ukraine deal imposed under Russian terms.
- Fast‑track mechanisms to shift supply chains away from countries that weaponise trade policy, including the US when it uses extraterritorial sanctions for domestic political gain.
None of these steps would sever ties with Washington, but they would change the tone: from supplicant to partner with leverage. That is the posture Democrats say they want to see, partly because it would also constrain Trump at home. A US president facing coordinated, credible European responses has less freedom to turn foreign policy into campaign theatre.
Key concepts Europeans are weighing in Munich
Several technical terms keep surfacing in corridor conversations and side panels. Understanding them helps clarify what is actually at stake.
Strategic autonomy refers to Europe’s ability to act in its own security interests without depending on the US. It does not mean full independence, but it does mean having enough military, economic and technological capacity to say no when American or Chinese demands clash with European goals.
Security guarantees for Ukraine usually involve long‑term pledges of weapons, training and intelligence, plus clear consequences if Russia violates any future settlement. Without US participation, those guarantees are harder to make credible, which is why European leaders still talk about Nato even as they float new EU defence frameworks.
Deals‑based order describes a system where big powers make one‑off bargains instead of following settled rules. In such an environment, small and mid‑size countries gain safety not from treaties alone but from coalitions, overlapping agreements and the ability to move quickly when conditions change. Democrats in Munich are effectively arguing that Europe needs to adjust to this world, because Trump embodies it.
If that shift happens, the debate at future Munich conferences will look different. Instead of asking how to “fix” the transatlantic relationship, leaders may focus on how two power centres – a more self‑reliant Europe and a more transactional US – can still cooperate under pressure from Russia, China and global crises, regardless of who sits in the Oval Office.
Originally posted 2026-02-15 01:09:58.